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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV-
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Harris9 98
(decided February 12, 1991)
Harris, a criminal defendant, claimed that his right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures, protected under both
the federal999 and state1°00 constitutions, was violated when he
was arrested after a warrantless and non-consensual entry into his
home. He, thus, contended that his station house statement, made
one hour after his arrest, and in violation of Payton v. New
York, 100 1 should have been suppressed. 1002 Upon remand from
998. 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1991) (Harris
I).
999. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1000. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
1001. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In Payton, the Court held that the fourth
amendment "prohibits the police from making a warrantless and
1002
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the United States Supreme Court, 100 3 the New York Court of
Appeals held that "statements obtained from an accused
following an arrest made in violation of Payton are not
admissible under the State Constitution if they are a product of
the illegality."' 1004 The court also based its decision on the New
York State Constitution's right to counsel provision, 0 05
determining that the "causal connection between the illegal arrest
and [Harris'] statement [at] the police station was not sufficiently
attenuated from the Payton wrong because of the temporal
proximity between the arrest and the statement, the absence of
intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the
police misconduct." 1006 Consequently, the court of appeals ruled
that Harris' station house statement must be suppressed under
article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution. 1007
nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony
arrest." Id. at 575.
1002. Harris II, 77 N.Y.2d at 434, 570 N.E.2d at 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
702.
1003. New York v. Harris, 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990), rev'g 72 N.Y.2d 614,
532 N.E.2d 1229, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1988) (the Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals' suppression of the defendant's station house statement on
fourth amendment grounds and reinstated the judgment against the defendant).
1004. Harris II, 77 N.Y.2d at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
706. The court of appeals noted that New York's right to counsel clause is
unique because it attaches once an arrest warrant is authorized and prevents
interrogation of the suspect absent his or her attorney. Under the federal rule,
criminal proceedings do not necessarily begin once an arrest warrant is issued,
and the suspect may be interrogated absent his or her attorney without
violating the suspect's federal right to counsel. Id. at 439-40, 570 N.E.2d at
1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
1005. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("In any trial in any court whatever the party
accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in
civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
and be confronted with the witnesses against him.").
1006. Id. at 440-41, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706; see also
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). In Brown, the Supreme Court
first outlined the factors to consider in deciding whether a confession obtained
after an illegal arrest is sufficiently attenuated from the illegality so that it may
be admitted into evidence. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04.
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Harris was convicted of second degree murder for killing his
girlfriend.1 00 8 The police had arrested him at his apartment.100 9
Although the police had probable cause, for five days, to arrest
Harris, they nevertheless failed to obtain an arrest warrant, which
constituted a violation of Payton v. New York. 1010 Harris made
inculpatory statements at his apartment in the presence of the
police, and these statements were suppressed at trial as a product
of an illegal arrest.1011 A subsequent statement made on
videotape was also suppressed at trial because it was deemed
involuntary. 1012 However, Harris' written statement, made at the
police station one hour after his arrest, was admitted into
evidence, 1013 and Harris was subsequently convicted.
The appellate division affirmed Harris' conviction after con-
cluding that the station house statement was properly
admitted. 1014 The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new
1008. People v. Harris, 72 N.Y.2d 614, 616, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 1229, 536
N.Y.S.2d 1, 1 (1988) (Harris 1), rev'd in part and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 1640
(1990), on remand, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702
(1991). A non-jury trial was held without defense counsel at Harris' request.
Id.
1009. Id. at 616-17, 532 N.E.2d at 1229-30, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 2. The court
of appeals adopted the trial court's finding that the officers went to Harris'
house intending to take him into custody - they came with guns drawn,
blocking the exits before Harris answered their knock. Harris 1I, 77 N.Y.2d at
436 n.1, 570 N.E.2d at 1052 n.1, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 703 n.1. The dissent
argued that the police only intended to "locate" Harris, and did not intend to
"arrest him illegally." Id. at 445, 570 N.E.2d at 1058, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 709
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
1010. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
1011. Harris 1, 72 N.Y.2d at 617, 532 N.E.2d at 1230, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
Harris admitted to slitting his girlfriend's throat, in fact almost decapitating
her, claiming that she was a bad mother. Harris 11, 77 N.Y.2d at 443, 570
N.E.2d at 1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (Bellacosa, J. dissenting).
1012. Harris 1, 72 N.Y.2d at 617, 532 N.E.2d at 1230, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
1013. Id. Harris made this written statement after he was read his Miranda
warnings a second time. Id.
1014. Harris, 124 A.D.2d 472, 507 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1st Dep't 1986). The
court accepted the trial court's finding that there had been sufficient
attenuation to justify admitting Harris' station house statement as it was
"'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful
invasion."' Id. at 472, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 823 (quoting Wong Sun v. United
1004 [Vol 8
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trial based on its ruling that the statement should have been
suppressed on Fourth Amendment grounds.10 15 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, reversed the court of appeals, and
reinstated the judgment against Harris. 10 16
On remand, the court of appeals concluded that the Supreme
Court's ruling did not "adequately protect the search and seizure
rights of the citizens of New York. '" 10 17 A sharply divided court
of appeals considered whether Harris' statements, though
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). The court further noted that as there was
probable cause to arrest Harris, the arrest would have otherwise been legal had
it not occurred in his apartment. Thus, the illegality was relevant in
determining whether the statement "represented an improper exploitation of
the underlying [] act." Id. at 472-73, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 823-24. The court
concluded that the statement was not made because Harris "felt committed by
what he had said at the apartment but because of a considered decision made
prior to the expected arrival of the police," thus removing the taint of
illegality. Id. at 473, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
1015. Harris 1, 72 N.Y.2d at 616, 532 N.E.2d at 1230, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
The court relied on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), and
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), in determining that Harris' statement
was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest to be admitted into
evidence. Harris 1, 72 N.Y.2d at 619-20, 622, 532 N.E.2d at 1231-34, 536
N.Y.S.2d at 4, 6. The court noted that Wong Sun stood for the proposition
that the "exclusionary rule operates to bar from trial any verbal statements
obtained as a direct result of an unlawful invasion." Harris 1, 72 N.Y.2d at
619, 532 N.E.2d at 1232, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 4. Brown then clarified Wong Sun
by addressing the "proper effect that should be given to Miranda warnings
administered after an illegal arrest." Id. The court then applied the three
factors laid out in Brown to determine whether the statement "was sufficiently
purged of this Fourth Amendment Payton violation" and concluded that it was
not. Id. at 620, 532 N.E.2d at 1232, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
1016. New York v. Harris, 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990). The Court held that
when "the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule
does not bar the state's use of a statement made by the defendant outside his
home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in
violation of Payton." Id. at 1644-45. The Court noted that Payton was only
designed to "protect the physical integrity of the home" and was not intended
as "protection for statements made outside [the suspect's] premises where the
police have probable cause to arrest . . . ." Id. at 1643. This analysis is
contrary to the court of appeals' interpretation of Payrton. See Harris I, 72
N.Y.2d at 623-24, 532 N.E.2d at 1234-35, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 6-7.
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admissible under federal standards, could withstand the scrutiny
of New York's constitutional prohibition against illegal searches
and seizures. 10 18 Because Harris sought relief under both the
federal and state constitutions, the majority rejected the dissent's
view that the remand was controlled by the Supreme Court's
ruling. The court of appeals was bound to address the state claim
to determine whether the conduct complained of violated the state
constitution. 1019
The court of appeals noted that its earlier decision to suppress
Harris' statement on Fourth Amendment grounds because it was
"tainted by the prior illegality and unredeemed by attenuation,"
represented what it thought the Federal Constitution required and
was consistent with prior state and federal decisions. 1020 The
court then noted that the Supreme Court's determination differed
sharply from this in its conclusion that "the police illegality was
in the entry, not the arrest," and that the causal connection be-
tween the illegality and the statement was broken once Harris ex-
ited the apartment.10 21 Thus, under the Supreme Court's
1018. Harris 11, 77 N.Y.2d at 435, 570 N.E.2d at 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
702 (in both court of appeals decisions, the court was split 5-2 with identical
judicial alignment).
1019. Id.; see also People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 384, 46 N.E.2d 329,
331 (1943) (where a right is guaranteed under federal and state constitutions,
courts may exercise independent judgment regarding scope and effect of state
constitutional rights and are not bound by Supreme Court judgments limiting
the scope of similar rights under the Federal Constitution); People ex rel.
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 503 N.E.2d 492, 494, 510
N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (1986); People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375, 378, 515
N.E.2d 898, 899, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213 (1987) (court is bound by Supreme
Court decisions in federal matters, but may exercise its independent judgment
when determining scope of individual rights under state constitution).
1020. Harris II, 77 N.Y.2d at 436, 570 N.E.2d at 1052, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
703; see People v. Conyers, 68 N.Y.2d 982, 983, 503 N.E.2d 108, 109, 510
N.Y.S.2d 552, 553 (1986) (statements made as product of illegal arrest must
be sufficiently attenuated from arrest to be purged of illegality); see also
United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S.
537 (1982) (statements made by defendant after illegal arrest in his home are
inadmissible if they were fruits of unlawful arrest).
1021. Harris 11, 77 N.Y.2d at 436, 570 N.E.2d at 1052, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
703. See also Harris 1, 72 N.Y.2d at 625-26, 532 N.E.2d at 1236, 536
N.Y.S.2d at 8 (Titone, J., concurring) (the wrong in Payton cases is not the
1006 [Vol 8
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analysis, "[n]o attenuation was required because the
deterrent value of suppressing this ... statement was minimal
"1022
This distinction led the majority to declare that the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment provided inade-
quate protection for New York citizens against an illegal search
and seizure, and to require that statements made by an accused
subsequent to a Payton violation "must be suppressed unless the
taint resulting from the violation has been attenuated." 1023
The court distinguished New York's search and seizure
requirements from those of the Federal Constitution. The
majority conceded that the language in the respective state and
federal constitutions prohibiting illegal searches and seizures is
identical. 1024 However, the court noted that state courts may
adopt a differing construction of a state provision "unconstrained
by a contrary Supreme Court interpretation of [its] Federal
counterpart" where sufficient reasons appear. 10 25 Relying on
People v. P.J. Video, Inc.,1026 the majority outlined the general
rules governing independent state review, contrasting an
interpretive review of New York constitutional provisions, which
examines its textual language as compared to its federal
detention itself, but manner in which arrest is carried out).
1022. Harris II, 77 N.Y.2d at 436-37, 570 N.E.2d at 1052, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
703.
1023. Id. at 437, 570 N.E.2d at 1053, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
1024. Id. Both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and
article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution state:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
1025. Harris II, 77 N.Y.2d at 437-38, 570 N.E.2d at 1053, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
704. See also People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553,
557, 503 N.E.2d 492, 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (1986) (function of
comparable state constitutional provisions, if not to be considered redundant,
may supplement those rights to meet state's particular needs and expectations).
1026.68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
1992] 1007
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counterpart, with a noninterpretive review, which "'proceeds
from a judicial perception of sound policy, justice and
fundamental fairness."' 1027  The court opted for the
noninterpretive analysis to enable it to focus on matters peculiar
to the state of New York. 1028
The majority noted that in determining whether a special rule
was needed to protect the constitutional rights of the accused, the
consequences emanating from the police illegality and the need
for a deterrent to remove any incentive on the part of the police
to violate the law must be considered. They rejected, as disposi-
tive, the fact that Harris voluntarily waived his Miranda rights
before making his statement, because the "interest in deterrence
does not disappear just because the defendant's statement was
voluntary or because he waived his right to counsel.")1029
The New York right to counsel rule formed the basis for reject-
ing the Supreme Court's ruling. The majority stated that under
New York's right to counsel rule attenuation is necessary to deter
Payton violations. 1030 They recounted the history of New York's
rule, noting that it has developed "'independent[ly] of its federal
1027. Harris II, 77 N.Y.2d at 438, 570 N.E.2d at 1053, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
704 (quoting P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 302-03, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 911).
1028. In doing so the majority considered such factors as:
Any pre-existing state statutory or common law defining the scope of
the individual right in question; the history and traditions of the state in
its protection of the individual right; any identification of the right in
the state constitution as being one of peculiar State or local concern; and
any distinctive attitudes of the state citizenry toward the definition,
scope or protection of the individual right.
Id. (citing P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 302-03, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 911).
1029. Id. at 438-39, 570 N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705. See also
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602-03 (1975) (Miranda warnings, while an
important factor in determining whether confession was obtained by
exploitation of illegal arrest alone, are not sufficient to attenuate taint of
unconstitutional arrest because "the effect of the exclusionary rule would be
substantially diluted.").
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counterpart."" 10 31 The majority then concluded that New York's
right to counsel rule is "'far more expansive than the Federal
counterpart"', 1032 and, thus, has become a matter of "singular
concern" in New York.1033 Furthermore, the majority
determined that the differing views between the Supreme Court
and the court of appeals on the present case "illustrate the
distinctive Federal and State right to counsel rules and the
concerns they engender.,, 1034
In support of its reasoning, the majority stated that there was
little incentive for the police to violate Payton under the federal
rules when attempting to secure a statement from a suspect.
Under federal law, criminal proceedings do not necessarily
commence once a warrant is issued, thus, the police could inter-
rogate a suspect absent a lawyer without violating his or her right
to counsel.1035 In New York, however, criminal proceedings
must be instituted before the police can obtain a warrant.1 036
Therefore, the majority, relying on People v. Samuels, 10 37
1031. Id. (quoting People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 161, 385 N.E.2d 612,
615, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (1978), overruled by People v. Skinner 52
N.Y.2d 24, 417 N.E.2d 501, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1980) ("we have extended
the protections afforded by our State Constitution beyond those of the Federal
[Constitution] . .. ")).
1032. Id. at 439, 570 N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705 (quoting People
v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 339, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1015, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474,
478, (1990); see also People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 517, 521, 553 N.E.2d
1008, 1011, 554 N.Y.S.2d 460, 463 (1990) (New York's right to counsel
extends "well beyond" its federal counterpart).
1033. Harris II, 77 N.Y.2d at 439, 570 N.E.2d at 1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
705.
1034. Id.
1035. Id. at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1054-55, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705-06. In its
support, the majority cited United States v. Reynolds, 762 F.2d 489, 493 (6th
Cir. 1985) (right to counsel attaches only after adversarial judicial proceedings
have been initiated, while issuance of a warrant merely indicates probable
cause to arrest - certainly not an adversarial proceeding); and United States v.
Pace, 833 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987) (sixth amendment right to counsel
does not attach upon the issuance of a warrant).
1036. See Peter Preiser, Practice Commentary to N.Y. CRmI. PRoc. LAw §
120.20 (McKinney 1992) ("authority to issue an arrest warrant is dependent
upon the existence of a filed accusatory instrument").
1037. 49 N.Y.2d 218, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1980).
1992] 1009
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declared that "in New York once an arrest warrant is authorized,
criminal proceedings have begun, the indelible right to counsel
attaches and police may not question a suspect in the absence of
an attorney." 1
03 8
In sum, in New York, if the police arrest a suspect in his or her
residence without a warrant, Payton is violated. However, once a
warrant is issued, criminal proceedings have begun and the de-
fendant's right to counsel attaches, the police cannot question the
defendant absent his or her counsel. It is with this interplay that
the majority sought to prevent abuse, and which "provide[d] the
compelling reason for deviating from the Supreme Court's
ruling." 1039 Had the police entered Harris' apartment pursuant to
a warrant, he could not have been questioned without his attorney
being present. Therefore, the majority concluded that the police
"should not enjoy greater latitude simply because they neglected
to obtain a warrant, as Payton requires, and entered the apart-
ment illegally."1040 Consequently, in order for Harris' statement
to be admissible, it had to be sufficiently attenuated from the
Payton violation.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Titone agreed
"wholeheartedly" with the majority's conclusion that New
York's right to counsel rules "provide sound support for a depar-
ture from Federal precedent and justify applying our own State
attenuation analysis in cases involving Payton violations. ' ' 1041
However, Judge Titone remained unwilling to extend Brown v.
Illinois1°42 and its progeny to suppress statements made
subsequent to an arrest which violated Payton, providing it would
1038. Harris 1!, 77 N.Y.2d at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
705 (citing Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d at 222-23, 400 N.E.2d at 1346-47, 424
N.Y.S.2d at 894 (defendant's right to counsel attached when felony arrest
warrant was issued and could only be waived in the presence of counsel)).
1039. Id. at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706. The majority
rationalized that the police had every reason to violate Payton because it
enabled them "to circumvent the accused's indelible right to counsel." Id.
1040. Id.
1041. Id. at 441, 570 N.E.2d at 1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
1042. 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (attenuation analysis required where police
lacked probable cause and warrant to arrest defendant).
1010 (Vol 8
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have been an otherwise lawful arrest.
As Judge Titone maintained in his concurrence, "I continue to
have serious misgivings about the unquestioning use of the Brown
[attenuation] analysis in cases involving Payton violations." ' 104 3
Instead, before attenuation should be considered, the courts, as a
threshold matter, should determine whether "'the challenged
evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental
activity. ' "'104 4 Judge Titone distinguished Brown from Payton,
noting that in Brown the threshold matter need not have been
addressed (it was assumed) because the police lacked probable
cause to arrest the defendant in the first place. Therefore, in
Brown the police did not have the right to control the defendant's
person at the time he made the incriminating statement. 1045 In
contrast, Judge Titone suggested the "wrong" in Payton was not
the detention itself, but the manner in which the arrest was
made. 1046 Thus, before the attenuation analysis is made the court
should determine "[w]hether there is a sufficient causal
relationship between this unlawful entry and the police's subse-
quent obtaining of a statement." 1047
The dissent, on remand, fervently derided the majority's
decision for failing to adhere to the Supreme Court's ruling on
the Payton issue; injecting a "significantly expanded State right
to counsel concept"; converting a "search and seizure dwelling
protection case into a theoretical right to counsel construct"; and,
necessitating its decision on a "perceived enhancement of
deterrence policy." 10 48 Judge Bellacosa asserted that the
1043. Harris 1, 72 N.Y.2d at 625, 532 N.E.2d at 1235, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 7
(Titone, I., concurring).
1044. Id. (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)).
1045. Id. at 625, 532 N.E.2d at 1235-36, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 7-8 (Titone, J.,
concurring) ("In these cases, the 'challenged evidence' - i.e., the post-arrest
confession - is unquestionably 'the product of [the] illegal government
activity' - i.e., the wrongful detention.") This analysis was cited with
approval in Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1643-44.
1046. Harris 1, 72 N.Y.2d at 625, 532 N.E.2d at 1236, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 8
(Titone, J., concurring).
1047. Id. at 626, 532 N.E.2d at 1236, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 8 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
1048. Harris II, 77 N.Y.2d at 442, 570 N.E.2d at 1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
1992] 1011
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majority's holding "metamorphosize[d] the Payton private
dwelling sanctuary into the public precinct house, and then
further transform[ed] the jurisprudence by converting Payton's
Fourth Amendment dwelling right into a fused Fifth and Sixth
Amendments personal right to counsel -- State version." 1049
Consequently, according to the dissent, "[t]he majority effec-
tively relegate[d] [the] Supreme Court's work to an academic ju-
dicial exercise .... "1050
The dissent claimed that the issue did not concern the police
invading Harris' dwelling but, rather, it involved the legality of
his station house confession. 1051 Thus, the court of appeals did
not act in conformity with the Supreme Court's ruling, despite
the Court's mandate directing the court of appeals to proceed
consistently with its opinion. 1052 Furthermore, the dissent
contended that the court should construe the Fourth Amendment
consistently with article I, section 12 because of the similarity of
verbiage and history. 1053
Judge Bellacosa explained that the "fundamental flaw" in the
majority's argument is that its prior decision embraced only
Fourth Amendment rights resulting from Payton violations and
"not the infringement of some artificially triggered right to
counsel." ' 1054 Additionally, the dissent noted that the majority
strayed from the precise holding of People v. Samuels,1055
creating a fictional extension of the rule itself. The dissent argued
707 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
1049. Id. at 447, 570 N.E.2d at 1059, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
1050. Id. (Bellacosa, J. dissenting).
1051. Id. (Bellacosa, J. dissenting).
1052. Id. at 443, 570 N.E.2d at 1056-57, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 707-08
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
1053. Id. at 443-44, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (Bellacosa,
J., dissenting).
1054. Id. at 444, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
1055. 49 N.Y.2d 218, 221-23, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 1346-47, 424 N.Y.S.2d
892, 894-95 (1980) (right to counsel attaches once felony complaint is filed
and warrant is issued and cannot be waived absent counsel, thus, statements
made by defendant absent counsel must be suppressed).
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that Samuels did not even apply in this case because "Harris was
arrested without a warrant and with no felony complaint filed and
with no criminal proceeding having been begun."1056
Furthermore, the dissent submitted that the majority's extension
was even more incredulous in light of the court of appeals' recent
decision in People v. Bing,1057 which contracted the right to
counsel protection. 1058
The dissent also rejected the deterrence argument propounded
by the majority, and asserted that the conduct Payton sought to
deter was the violation of the "dwelling sanctuary pro-
tection." 10 59 Thus, the dissent considered as speculative the
majority's argument that the police intended to violate Harris'
Payton right and "evade any of his New York counsel
rights." 10 60 Instead, the dissent subscribed to the Supreme
Court's "common sense" analysis regarding the incentive to obey
Payton and thus saw no reason to "stretch precedent and twist
logic" in order to rescue Harris from the Supreme Court decision
against him. 1061
On the federal level, in New York v. Harris,1062 the Supreme
Court ruled that Payton does not protect criminal defendants for
1056. Harris II, 77 N.Y.2d at 444, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
708 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
1057. 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
1058. Harris II, 77 N.Y.2d at 444, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
708 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). See Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 348-50, 558 N.E.2d at
1021-22, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85 (defendant represented by counsel on prior
unrelated charge was not deprived of right to counsel under state constitution
when, in absence of that counsel, waived his right to counsel when questioned
by police on matters unrelated to prior pending charge).
1059. Harris II, 77 N.Y.2d at 445, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
708 (Bellacosa, I., dissenting).
1060. Id. (Bellacosa, I., dissenting). In fact, the dissent argued that the
police were under "no constitutional or legal obligation to obtain a warrant
and thus commence the criminal proceeding" at the time which a court, in
retrospect, might determine to be "the moment of truth." Id. (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
1061. Harris II, 77 N.Y.2d at 445, 570 N.E.2d at 1058, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
709 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
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statements made outside their homes when the police had
probable cause to arrest the defendant for committing the
crime. 1063 Instead, the Court stated that Payton was "designed to
protect the physical integrity of the home . . . "1064
Consequently, the Court found "[n]othing in the reasoning of
[Payton to] suggestl that an arrest in a home without a warrant
...somehow renders unlawful continued custody of the suspect
once he is removed from the house" providing there was
probable cause for the arrest. 1065 A defendant whose arrest is
otherwise grounded on probable cause is not unlawfully in
custody when removed to the police station. Therefore, the
admissibility of the defendant's subsequent statements, made after
waiver of his or her Miranda right, would not be dependent upon
an attenuation analysis since such statements would not be "an
exploitation of the illegal entry." 1066
The Harris court distinguished the instant case from Brown v.
Illinois10 67 and its progeny1068 on the ground that the evidence
1063. Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1644-45. Under Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573 (1980), the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment "prohibits the
police from making a warrantless and non-consensual entry into a suspect's
home in order to make a routine arrest." Payton, 445 U.S. at 576.
1064. Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1643. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 ("the
'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed."') (quoting United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
1065. Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1643.
1066. Id. at 1644. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980) (as
a threshold matter, before attenuation analysis is required, court must
determine that challenged evidence is somehow a product of illegal
government activity); see also United States v. Ceccolina, 435 U.S. 268, 276
(1978) ("we have declined to adopt a 'per se or but for rule' that would make
inadmissible any evidence, whether tangible or live-witness testimony, which
somehow came to light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal
arrest."). But see United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980)
(statements made by defendant after his arrest, albeit based on probable cause,
in violation of Payton, deemed inadmissible as the fruits of an unlawful
arrest), aff'd, 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
1067. 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (court suppressed inculpatory statements made by
defendant arrested without probable cause or warrant although given Miranda
warning). Id. at 604-05.
1068. See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982) (confession obtained
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obtained from the defendants in those cases after their arrest, was
suppressed because the police lacked probable cause.1069 The
Court maintained that those cases stood for the "proposition that
the indirect fruits of an illegal search or arrest should be
suppressed when they bear a sufficiently close relationship to the
underlying illegality. "1070 The Court submitted that the illegality
in Brown was the lack of probable cause and the wrong was the
police custody of the defendant at the time the inculpatory
statements were made. Conversely, in the Harris case, the
illegality was the Payton violation, not the subsequent detention
of Harris. 10 71 Thus, the police were justified in questioning
Harris. As a result, the Court concluded that Harris' statement
made at the station house "was not an exploitation of the illegal
entry into [his] home."' 1072 As such, the attenuation analysis was
not applicable to determine whether Harris' statements should be
suppressed. 1073
The Supreme Court had previously addressed the policies un-
derlying the exclusionary rule1074 when determining whether to
suppress evidence. In Wong Sun v. United States,1075 the Court
noted that the exclusionary rule seeks to deter "lawless conduct
by federal officers" as well as "closing the doors of the federal
through custodial interrogation after defendant arrested without warrant or
probable cause should be suppressed as fruit of illegal arrest); Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (confession made by defendant at police
station after his illegal arrest was not sufficiently attenuated to be admitted at
trial).
1069. Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1643.
1070. Id.
1071. Id. at 1643-44.
1072. Id. at 1644.
1073. Id. at 1643.
1074. The fourth amendment does not contain a provision expressly
prohibiting the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands. United
States* v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). Instead, the exclusionary rule
operates as "'a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved."' Id. (quoting United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
1075. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained."
' 1076
However, the Harris Court also noted that the exclusionary rule
does not require that "'anything which deters illegal searches is
thereby commanded by the Fourth Amendment.' 1077 The
Harris Court stated that the Federal Constitution did not require
them to "go further and suppress statements later made . . . in
order to deter police from violating Payton.'"1078 The Court
reasoned that "the principal incentive to obey Payton still
obtains: the police know that a warrantless entry will lead to the
suppression of any evidence found or statements taken inside the
home." 1079 However, the need to suppress subsequent statements
made outside the home is minimal where probable cause exists to
arrest the defendant as the police "need not violate Payton in
order to interrogate the suspect." 10 80 The Harris Court
concluded that "lt is doubtful . . . that the desire to secure
[such] a statement from a criminal suspect would motivate the
police to violate Payton." 1081
When a defendant is arrested with probable cause, but in viola-
tion of Payton, statements made by the defendant within his or
her dwelling at the time of the arrest will be suppressed pursuant
to both article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution
and the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
However, in New York, statements obtained from that defendant
subsequent to the Payton violation will be further protected by
New York's constitutional right to counsel, article I, section 6, to
the extent that the police must show that the subsequent statement
was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest to preclude
suppression.
New York courts are not alone in extending greater protection
to citizens from searches and seizures than is extended by the
United States Supreme Court. Subsequent to the Harris decision,
1076. Id. at 486.
1077. Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1644 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 910).
1078. Id.
1079. Id.
1080. Id. Unlike its New York counterpart, the federal right to counsel does
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the Appellate Court of Connecticut, in State v. Geisler,10 82
concluded that the "federal exclusionary rule, as narrowed by
New York v. Harris, . . . does not ensure that Connecticut
citizens' rights, as guaranteed by our state constitution, will be
adequately protected." ' 10 83 The court held that the Connecticut
Constitution10 84 "bars the state from using evidence acquired
outside a defendant's home following a Payton violation, unless
the taint resulting from the violation is sufficiently attenuated
from the initial entry into the home." ' 1085 The Geisler court
voiced concerns about the deterrent value of the Harris decision
on police conduct. It stated that "[b]y requiring that only
evidence acquired inside a home following a Payton violation be
suppressed, the per se rule in Harris does not grant to
Connecticut citizens the scope of the exclusion that we believe is
necessary to deter the police from entering a home without a
warrant. "1086
The California Supreme Court chose to follow the rationale of
New York v. Harris in People v. Marquez. 1087 Although the court
determined that Harris was not "necessarily determinative in this
case because the crimes here were committed before the passage
of Proposition 8,"1088 it nevertheless adhered to the Harris ratio-
1082. 594 A.2d 985 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) appeal granted, in part, 597
A.2d 342 (1991).
1083. Id. at 990.
1084. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 7. The pertinent language of the Connecticut
Constitution is similar to that contained in the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to
search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue without
describing them as clearly as may be, nor without probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation.
Id.
1085. Geisler, 594 A.2d at 990.
1086. Id. at 989.
1087. 822 P.2d 418 (Cal. 1992).
1088. Id. at 425. Proposition 8 was a 1982 amendment to the California
Constitution, CAI1. CONST. art. I, § 28(d), which provides, in pertinent part,
that "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding
. ." The crimes in this case were committed in 1979. Proposition 8 was not
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nale. In determining whether a station house confession made af-
ter a Payton10 89 violation should be suppressed, the court decided
that "[flor the reasons stated in New York v. Harris, ... we are
persuaded that the California Constitution does not require that
the confession be suppressed . ... 1090 Therefore, the court
concluded that the lack of an arrest warrant will not require
suppression of subsequent statements made by the defendant at
the police station. 1091
People v. effen10 92
(decided November 19, 1991)
A criminal defendant contended that his right to be protected
against unreasonable searches under the New York State
Constitution1093 was violated. The defendant contended that a
canine "sniff' and x-ray of a package addressed to him
applied retroactively.
1089. The court also relied upon People v. Ramey, 545 P.2d 1333 (Cal.),
cert denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976), in which the court held that warrantless
arrests within the home are per se unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.
Id. at 1341.
1090. Marquez, 822 P.2d at 426.
1091. Id. See also State v. Christiansen, 810 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1990) (court cited Harris when it stated: "Where the police have
probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the use of
defendant's statements made outside of his home, even if it is taken after an
invalid warrantless arrest in violation of Payton."); People v. Brown, 574
N.E.2d 78, 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (court cited Harris in support of its
decision not to suppress statements outside defendant's home subsequent to
warrantless arrest in defendant's home); State v. Corpier, 793 S.W.2d 430,
439 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) ("We therefore hold, as in Harris, that the police
had probable cause to arrest the defendant prior to the unlawful entry ... and
thus the subsequent confession . . . not obtained at the apartment, w[as] not
the fruiti] of the illegal arrest.").
1092. 78 N.Y.2d 1089, 585 N.E.2d 370, 578 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1991). For
additional case analysis see the discussion of the appellate division, fourth
department's decision in New York State Constitutional Decisions: 1990
Compilation, 8 TouRo L. REv. 235, 428-432 (1991).
1093. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. ("The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... ").
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